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Abstract
The border eﬀects literature ﬁnds that political boundaries have a large impact
on relative prices across locations. In this paper we show that the standard empirical
speciﬁcation suﬀers from selection bias, and propose a new methodology based on
binned-quantile regressions. We use a novel micro-price dataset from Uruguay and focus
on city borders. We ﬁnd that when the standard methodology is used, two supermarkets
separated by 10 kilometers across two diﬀerent cities have the same price dispersion
as two supermarkets separated by 30 kilometers within the same city, implying that
crossing a city border is equivalent to tripling the distance. By contrast, when upper
quantiles are used the city border eﬀect disappears. These ﬁndings imply that transport
cost have have systematically underestimated by previous literature. Our methodology
can be applied to measure any kind of border eﬀect. We illustrate this in the context
of online-oine price dispersion to measure an online-border eﬀect in the city of
Montevideo.
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1 Introduction
Political borders can have a signiﬁcant impact on relative prices. The degree of price segmen-
tation caused by such boundaries was empirically documented in a seminal paper by Engel
and Rogers (1996), who showed with CPI data that the USCanadian border had an eﬀect
on price dispersion equivalent to adding a distance of at least 1,780 miles between locations
(approximately the distance between Miami and Quebec). Their work spurred a large lit-
erature that found similarly large border eﬀects across countries, states, and even cities.1
These results have been heavily debated over the years. Some papers have argued that (i)
the distances have been mis-measured (see Head and Mayer (2002)), (ii) the regressions
suﬀer from aggregation bias (see Evans (2003) and Broda and Weinstein (2008)), (iii) the
gravity equation implied in the standard speciﬁcation has been misspeciﬁed (see Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003)), and that (iv) the regressions
do not have a proper benchmark due to the fact that country distributions of prices are very
diﬀerent across countries (see Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009)). Despite all this work, the
magnitude and reasons behind the segmentation introduced by political borders is still an
open question in the literature.
In this paper we propose a simple method to estimate the size of the border eﬀect based
on Samuelson's iceberg cost model. This methodology imply that largest price diﬀerences
observed between locations are relevant for transport cost estimation. We ﬁrst argue that the
standard regression is based on an arbitrage inequality constraint, and that using all price
observations creates a selection bias that aﬀects both the distance and border coeﬃcients (and
therefore the estimates of the border eﬀect). We propose an alternative approach based on
quantile regressions that corrects for the selection bias while simultaneously controlling for
1For example, see Parsley and Wei (2001) for results between the US and Japan and Ceglowski (2003)
for the eﬀects of provincial borders in Canada.
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potential measurement errors.
Our method can be explained using a very simple framework along the lines of Engel and
Rogers (1996). Consider the problem of a ﬁrm that sets a price bounded by the existence of
an arbitrage constraint. If the arbitrage cost between two establishments (i and j) is τ , and
p denotes the log price in each location, then the arbitrage constraint can be expressed as a
simple inequality:
|pi − pj| ≤ τ (1)
where τ is a function of distance, political boundaries, and other regional and product
characteristics. The literature typically estimates τ and the border eﬀects by running the
following regression on price dispersion:2
|pi,t − pj,t| = α + βDi,j + γBi,j + δXi,j,t + i,j,t (2)
where pi,t − pj,t is the log price diﬀerence between locations i and j at time t. The locations
can be countries, provinces, cities or establishments. Di,j is the distance between the two
locations, Bi,j is a dummy that takes value 1 if a border exists between locations i and j, and
Xi,j,t is a series of additional controls. In this context, the border eﬀect is the equivalent
number of miles that would produce the same dispersion as the estimated border dummy
coeﬃcient γ. In its simplest form, it is the ratio γ/β, which means that a bias in either (or
both) of these coeﬃcients will have an impact on the estimate of the border eﬀect.
We argue that τ and its determinants cannot be estimated through a simple OLS re-
gression because prices in the two locations are an optimal choice subject to an inequality
2A common alternative speciﬁcation used by papers such as Engel and Rogers (1996) has the standard
deviation σ (pi,t − pj,t) instead. In both cases, the objective is to measure the eﬀect of the righ-hand side
variables on price dispersion, which can be done either through the mean of the absolute value or the standard
deviation of the price diﬀerences. Our results do not change if we use the standard deviation. See Broda
and Weinstein (2008) for an overview of the papers that use these two regressions in the literature.
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constraint that is not necessarily binding. If the optimal prices of the two stores lie within
the constraint, then their diﬀerence is smaller than τ and these observations are not rele-
vant to estimate the arbitrage costs. To illustrate this, consider two markets that are highly
segmented but have identical supply and demand characteristics. Goods will have the same
price across the two locations, but this price gap tells us nothing about the arbitrage costs
or the degree of segmentation between the markets. In fact, all observations within the no-
arbitrage range suﬀer from selection bias, and estimates that use the mean or the standard
deviation of |p1 − p2| will be biased downward as well.
The arbitrage cost τ is better estimated when we use only the largest observed price
diﬀerences between locations. Those are the observations that provide information about
the limit that arbitrage imposes of the magnitude of price dispersion.3 Ideally we would
like to use the maximum observed price gap between locations, but it is potentially sensitive
to measurement errors.4 Instead, we estimate a series of binned-quantile regressions that
allow us to measure the sensitivity of our estimates to the errors-in-variables. We start
with the mean price gap between locations (equivalent to the method typically used in the
literature), and then use only the observations in the 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th percentiles, and
the maximum observed price diﬀerence.
We apply this method to study the impact of city borders on price dispersion in Uruguay.
We use a novel good-level dataset composed by daily prices from 202 UPC-level products
sold in 333 supermarkets across 47 cities collected between 2007 and 2010. When we ﬁrst
estimate the border eﬀect using standard methods, we ﬁnd that the city border between two
3The estimation problem is analogous to estimating using inequality moments as opposed to equality mo-
ments. This area has received signiﬁcant attention recently. See for example Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004),
Andrews and Guggenberger (2009), Andrews and Soares (2010), Andrews and Shi (2014), Ponomareva and
Tamer (2011), and Rosen (2008).
4A related idea in the context of trade can be found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) who propose estimating
trade friction using the maximum price diﬀerence. Simonovska and Waugh (2014) criticizes the use of the
maximum price diﬀerence in the estimating strategies, based on the possibility of bias of the estimator on
ﬁnite samples.
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stores separated by 10 kilometers is larger than 20 kilometers wide, and statistically diﬀerent
from zero. This implies that the border triples the distance of stores across the city borders.
However when we re-estimate using distance-binned quantile regressions, the border declines
until it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As expected from our discussion both the
distance and border dummy coeﬃcients are downward biased in the standard regression, but
the bias is largest on the distance parameter.5 As a result, the net impact is that the implied
border eﬀect (in kilometers) falls.
We perform robustness tests to correct for outliers, product mix, and we change the spec-
iﬁcation to include non-linearity and interaction terms. In all of them, the city-border eﬀect
measured in kilometers tends to disappear when higher percentiles are used. Furthermore,
the results are similar at the 99th, 99.5th, 99.9th percentile, and the maximum, suggesting
that the estimates are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by potential errors in the data.
We further illustrate our methodology to study the dispersion between online and oine
prices. We use daily prices collected from the website of the largest grocery retailer in
Montevideo, and compare them to the prices in all oine locations of the same retailer. The
oine store's data provide an estimate of the impact of distance on price dispersion across
locations. The online border is simply the distance that would generate the same eﬀect on
online-oine price dispersion observed in the data. When the standard procedure is used,
online and oine markets appear to be very closely integrated, with a border eﬀect of just
1.6 kilometers. However, when we use the 95th percentile of the price gap distribution, the
online border eﬀect becomes 8.8 kilometers, a number close to the actual average physical
distance between the online warehouse (where the online goods are delivered from) and each
of the oine stores in the city.6
5The reason is that price gaps within the arbitrage constraint are less common for observations across
cities, and therefore the border coeﬃcient is less aﬀected by the selection bias. Within cities, by contrast,
small price gaps are very frequent and can greatly bias the distance coeﬃcient.
6The retailer's website indicates that the online prices match those of the store where the orders are
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Our approach and the nature of the data address four additional sources of concerns that
have been raised since the original Engel-Rogers regressions. First, we use product-level data
with identical goods across all locations. As suggested by Goldberg and Knetter (1997),
product-level data is crucial to understand deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP).
Indeed, Evans (2003) and Broda and Weinstein (2008) argue that a signiﬁcant problem in
the border eﬀect literature is the aggregation bias induced by price indexes. Second, we use
retail prices. Hillberry and Hummels (2003) have argued that business-to-business data tends
to overestimate trade ﬂows and to underestimate price diﬀerences within countries. Third,
we know the exact location of each store. As pointed out by Head and Mayer (2002), using
approximate distances (such as from one country capital to another) can greatly overestimate
the border eﬀect. Finally, all the stores in our sample sell the same set of products. As Evans
(2003) points out, the mix of products sold across borders can lead to a bias in the standard
regressions.
Compared to recent papers in the literature, our results are consistent with Gorod-
nichenko and Tesar (2009), who argue that with cross-country heterogeneity in the dis-
tribution of within-country price diﬀerentials there is no clear benchmark from which to
gauge the eﬀect of the border. We agree with this statement, but we show that even in the
absence of a structural model it is still possible to obtain a simple and reliable estimate for
the magnitude of the border eﬀect using quantile regressions. Our paper is also complemen-
tary to the work of Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li (2011) who estimate the border
eﬀect by studying the response of average prices in one market to cost shocks in another
market. An advantage of our approach is that it does not require any cost data.
sent from, but it does not provide details on what speciﬁc store it is. In order to identify the most likely
candidate, we compared daily online prices for all products with each oine store in the city and found a
location where prices were identical 97.3 percent of the time. That location has an average distance of 7.2
kilometers to all the other stores.
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2 Methodology
In this section we present a simple model of price-setting across locations that provides the
inequality we use to estimate arbitrage costs and the border eﬀect. In particular, we propose
a model where the ﬁrms' pricing decision is constrained by the ability of the consumer
to arbitrage the price gap between two locations. Standard OLS regressions used in the
literature consider all pairs of prices, including those that lie within the arbitrage constraint,
which introduces a bias in the estimates of factors that aﬀect the cost to arbitrage, such as
distance and political borders. We propose an alternative methodology that focuses on the
largest observed price diﬀerences between locations using binned-quantile regressions.
2.1 A simple model of price-setting with arbitrage
2.1.1 Consumers
Consider an economy with a mass of consumers uniformly distributed along a line. This
line encompasses two cities (A, B) of equal distance. There are J stores in the economy, JA
stores in city A and JB stores in city B. There is also a border between A and B, in the
sense that consumers pay a cost whenever they cross to another city. This border cost may
arise due to diﬀerences in taxes, convenience in shopping hours, and other characteristics
associated with the city but not driven by distance. A consumer located on point ` and
buying in store i has an indirect utility function represented by
u` (i) = v − θpi − β˜ | `− `i | −γ˜bi − δ˜Ii (3)
where v is the reservation price of the consumer, and θ captures how sensitive the consumer
is to prices. The rest of the parameters measure transaction costs: β˜ measures unit trans-
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portation costs, multiplied by the distance between the consumer location (`) and the store
position (`i) (including information costs about the store, such as knowing the distance to
the store or its prices); bi is a dummy that takes value 1 if the consumer and the store are
in diﬀerent cities; and Ii measures additional store-speciﬁc costs not related with distance,
such as learning the layout and sale events of a given store.
Since the consumer buys the one item that maximizes his utility, we can compare the
price each consumer pays across all possible pairs of stores.7 The consumer ` weakly prefers
store i to store j if u` (i) ≥ u` (j), for each i, j ∈ J = (JA + JB), i 6= j. For simplicity assume
the price elasticity and the transportation cost are symmetric in all locations. This implies
that:
v − θpi − β˜ | `− `i | −γ˜bi − δ˜Ii ≥ v − θpj − β˜ | `− `j | −γ˜bj − δ˜Ij (4)
Rearranging terms we obtain:
pi − pj ≤ β˜
θ
(| `− `j | − | `− `i |) + γ˜
θ
M bi,j +
δ˜
θ
M Ii,j (5)
where M bij is equal to 1 if both stores are located in diﬀerent cities and 0 otherwise, and
M Ii,j measures the incremental information cost incurred by changing the store. Thus for
each pair of stores the consumption decision can be expressed as the result of inequality (6).
The value of the distance terms depends on which store is further away from the consumer.
If the diﬀerence between | ` − `j | − | ` − `i | is negative, the price diﬀerence could simply
be deﬁned as (pj − pi). Therefore, the expression is simpliﬁed to the absolute diﬀerence of
the location between stores:
| pi − pj |≤ β˜
θ
|`i − `j|+ γ˜
θ
M bi,j +
δ˜
θ
M Ii,j (6)
7We require that v is large enough so that is u` (i) is positive in at least one store.
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Comparing across diﬀerent pairs, if the distance increases, a border exists between the
stores, or there is a positive cost of switching stores, the level of price dispersion rises. The
opposite occurs if consumers are more sensitive to prices. It can be shown that the price space
is not empty and that the inequality constraint is only binding for the marginal consumer.8
Where the marginal consumer is traditionally deﬁned as indiﬀerent between buying in two
diﬀerent stores. This implies that the rest of the consumers are not indiﬀerent between two
stores and always prefer to buy on a particular one. In the end, the marginal consumer is
the one for which the inequality is binding, and deﬁnes the demand for each store.
2.1.2 Producers
Assume there are JA and JB identical producers (or stores) in each city that sell an identical
good at price pj, where j ∈ J = (JA + JB). Each producer maximizes proﬁts, given the prices
of the other stores and subject to the participation constraint of the consumers. Suppose
all producers, except for j, are in equilibrium. Then ﬁrm j sets its price subject to the
participation constraint of consumer `:
max
pj
∏
j
(pj/p−j)
st pj ∈ <+
and to the other J − 1 consumer constraints
| pi − pj |≤ β˜
θ
|`i − `j|+ γ˜
θ
M bij +
δ˜
θ
M Ii,j, ∀i ∈ J, i 6= j
where this condition applies to all the J ﬁrms in the sample.
8See the proof in Appendix A.1
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Firms maximize proﬁts when setting the maximum price for the marginal consumer, as
shown in Appendix A.1. This in turn implies that the inequality will not be binding for the
rest of the consumers. Therefore comparing pairs of prices for all stores to estimate equation
6 will not result in the correct measure of the consumers' parameters, as only those where
the restriction is binding are valid.
2.2 Binned-Quantile Regressions
This model of inequality constraints provides an equation that can be estimated as any other
regression in the literature of border eﬀects.9 In this case, the speciﬁcation can be deﬁned
as follows
| pi,t − pj,t |≤ βDi,j + γBi,j + δXi,j,t + εi,j,t (7)
where βDi,j ≡ β˜θ |`i − `j|, γBi,j ≡ γ˜θMbi,j, and δXi,j,t ≡ δ˜θMIi,j.
Notice that this inequality implies that all the residuals (i,j,t) in equation 7 are either
zero or negative, in which case E [i,j,t] ≤ 0. When this happens the estimation by OLS
is expected to produce biased estimates due to the failure of the orthogonality conditions,
where the bias is downward. There is only one case in which the estimates remain unbiased,
and is if the price deviations are exactly equal to the arbitrage cost i.e. the constraint is
always binding. The residuals are identical to zero and OLS produces unbiased estimates.
Intuitively prices are assumed free of errors-in-variables, so that the extreme in the distri-
bution of price diﬀerences is the closest estimator to the arbitrage costs. It is important
to mention that if all prices are optimally chosen to lie within the no-arbitrage region then
even the estimation using the extreme of the price distribution will produce downward bi-
ased estimates. However by construction the biases will be smaller. Formally, the expected
9The results from our model are also related to Samuelson (1954). See Appendix A.2.
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value of the errors at the medium are more negative than the errors at the 95th quantile:
E [i,j,t|50th] ≤ E [i,j,t|95th] ≤ 0. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Simonovska and Waugh
(2014) the maximum price diﬀerence could introduce additional biases, so we use instead the
upper quintiles for our estimation.10
Figure 1 illustrates how the observed price dispersion may not be informative of the
arbitrage cost. Panel (a) in Figure 1 shows hypothetical prices over time of one product in
two locations. If the no-arbitrage condition is binding, then as the arbitrage cost τ decreases,
so does the price dispersion. However if the condition is not binding, as shown in Panel (b),
distributional statistics such as the mean or the standard deviation will not be associated
with the estimate of τ . In both cases, however, we would be able to obtain good estimates
of τ by using only the maximum observed price diﬀerence.
[Figure 1 here]
Figure 2 makes a similar point with real data. We plot the distribution of price diﬀerences
for all goods between two locations of a given retailer, and compare the results for stores
located at 1 km, 10 km (same city), 10 km (diﬀerent cities), and 20 km (diﬀerent cities) of
each other. As expected, as the distance increases the share of price gaps at 0% falls (see
table), and the mass between 1% and 20% increases. Interestingly, when we compare the
two pairs of stores located at 10 km from each other (one of which is for stores in diﬀerent
cities), we ﬁnd that crossing the city border has an eﬀect on the mean and 90th percentile.
The two pairs, however, have exactly the same gaps at the 99th and 99.9th percentiles of the
distribution. This last result is consistent with the idea that city borders should not aﬀect
the cost to arbitrage across locations. Using the mean and lower percentiles of the price gaps
10Note that Simonovska and Waugh (2014) argues that the estimation of the transport costs can be
downward biased if the maximum price diﬀerence is used, but we ﬁnd a monotonic increase in this parameter
as we use move from lower quintiles to the maximum price diﬀerence.
11
that lie within the arbitrage constraint can therefore lead to biased results.
[Figure 2 here]
In order to address this selection bias, we propose a new method to estimate border eﬀects
using distance-binned quantile regressions. The methodology can be described as follows:
First, compute the absolute price diﬀerence for all possible location (stores) pairs. Repeat
this exercise across time and all goods, and pool all observations.
Second, deﬁne distance-border-bins according to a discrete spacing criteria that depends
on the unit of observation (city vs countries) and the availability of enough observations
within each bin. In the case of the city eﬀect, stores are assigned to bins of a few miles
apart. If the unit of analysis is countries, bins should be larger to contain stores that are
separated by larger distances. The distance in each bin does not have to be set in linear
increments. For simplicity denote each bin as n, where n = {1, . . . , N}, and N is the number
of bins. Each bin is deﬁned by a distance Dn, a dummy Bn = 1 if there is a border between
the two stores, and additional controls Xn. In our case, Xn includes a chain dummy and an
interaction term between distance and city dummy.
Third, compute the relevant quantile statistic of the absolute price diﬀerences for each
bin. Denote the statistic as Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) for the qth percentile of bin n.
Finally, estimate the following equation:
Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) = α + βDn + γBn + δXn + n (8)
In Figure 3 we depict the impact of the bias and the intuition behind our methodology.
The horizontal axis shows the bins for a range of distances, and the vertical axis is the
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absolute price diﬀerence. The dots mark the absolute diﬀerences in the data for each of the
selected bins. The thick black line reﬂects the price diﬀerence implied by the no-arbitrage
constraint. Because all the observed price diﬀerences are less than or equal to the thick line,
the estimation in the standard regression which implicitly uses the mean within each bin
is downward biased as denoted by the red line. In small samples, the true maximum per
bin might not be observed, and therefore estimating via the sample maximum will also be
downward biased. Still, in this case the bias is smaller than using the mean. In other words,
it is possible that there is no realization on the black line, but using the maximum within
each bin gets closer to the true line. This explains why we interpret our results as a lower
bound estimate of the degree of segmentation.
[Figure 3 here]
2.3 Dealing with errors-in-variables
One of the reasons we use quantile regressions to estimate arbitrage costs, instead of only
the maximum, is to relax the assumption of no errors-in-variables (EIV). In particular, the
maximum of the price diﬀerence distribution within each bin can be signiﬁcantly aﬀected if
prices are mis-measured. These errors can arise either because prices are observed and/or
reported with errors, or because stores make mistakes and post prices outside the no-arbitrage
range. When we describe our data in Section 3 it will become clear that the errors from
misreporting are very small, because of the way the data is collected. However, there is still
the possibility that the prices are incorrectly reported, and thus concentrating the estimates
on the maximum within each bin would exacerbate the impact of any errors-in-variables.
This case is depicted in Figure 4. The black thick line is still the true upper bound
of the no-arbitrage band, that is the true degree of segmentation. However due to EIV,
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some price diﬀerences might even be above the no-arbitrage range. In this case, using the
maximum within each bin also produces a bias in the estimation.
[Figure 4 here]
We address errors-in-variables in two ways. One is to eliminate outliers from the distri-
bution. As we discuss below, the type of errors that are likely to be present in our data are
misplacement of the decimal point or ﬂipping digits, both of which are likely to produce large
price changes at the item level that we can identify. This approach, however, does not pro-
vide a deﬁnite answer. For example, if the estimates change little then it is not clear whether
the EIV had a small impact, or not enough observations were eliminated to remove the bias.
The alternative we propose it to estimate the regression using diﬀerent quantiles. Within
each bin we compute several quantiles the median, 80th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentiles.11
The 50th and 80th percentiles are clearly less aﬀected by the EIV than the maximum, but
those estimates will be aﬀected by the sample selection of prices within the no-arbitrage
range. As we move towards higher percentiles, the estimates are less aﬀected by the sample
selection, and more aﬀected by the EIV. If the EIV is small, it should be the case that the
estimates are monotonically increasing. We evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of our
estimates in Section 4.1.
3 Data
We use a good-level dataset of daily prices compiled by The General Directorate of Commerce
(DGC) which comprises grocery stores all over the country.12 The DGC is the authority
11We also evaluate the robustness of our estimates to the elimination of price change outliers.
12The same dataset is used in Borraz and Zipitria (2012).
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responsible for the enforcement of the Consumer Protection Law at the Ministry of Economy
and Finance.
In 2006 a new tax law was passed by the Uruguayan legislature which changed the tax
base and rates of the value added tax (VAT). The Ministry of Economy and Finance was
concerned about incomplete pass-through from tax reductions to consumer prices, and hence
decided to collect and publish a dataset of prices in diﬀerent grocery stores and supermarkets
across the country. The DGC issued Resolution Number 061/006 which mandates grocery
stores and supermarkets to report its daily prices for a list of products if they meet the
following two conditions: i) they sell more than 70% of the products listed, and ii) either
have more than four grocery stores under the same name, or have more than three cashiers
in a store. The information sent by each retailer is a sworn statement, and they are subject
to penalties in case of misreporting. The objective of the DGC is to ensure that prices
posted reﬂect real posted prices by stores. In this regard, stores are free to set the prices
they optimally choose, but they face a penalty only if they try to misreport them
The data includes daily prices from April 1st of 2007 to December 31th of 2010 for 202
items corresponding to 61 product categories, where each item is deﬁned by its universal
product code (UPC).13 The three highest-selling brands are reported for each product cate-
gory. Most items had to be homogenized in order to be comparable, and each supermarket
must always report the same item. For example, sparkling water of the Salus" brand is
reported in its 2.25 liter variety by all stores. If this speciﬁc variety is not available at a
store, then no price is reported. Whenever prices are 50% greater (or less) than the average
price, the retailer is contacted to conﬁrm whether the submitted price is correct. The data
are then used in a public web site that allows consumers to check prices in diﬀerent stores
13The only exceptions are meat, eggs, ham, some types of cheese, and bread. However, as we later show,
the exclusion of these goods which could potentially be aﬀected by an imperfect matching, does not modify
the results.
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or cities and to compute the cost of diﬀerent baskets of goods across locations.14
After the exclusion of observations labeled as preliminary as well as wrongly categorized
or unidentiﬁed data (e.g. products that share the same UPC), our ﬁnal dataset is composed
by 202 products at the UPC level in 333 grocery stores from 47 cities. Table 1 describes the
summary statistics of the coverage in the data, and Appendix A.4 provides a detailed list
of the products. In addition, see Figure 5 for a map with the cities covered in the dataset.
These cities represent more than 80% of the total population of Uruguay. Montevideo, with
45% of the population, accounts for 58% of the supermarkets in the sample. The maximum
distance between two supermarkets is 526 kilometers.15
We consider two datasets separately to account for outliers that may have a greater
impact on the largest price diﬀerences between one good. A baseline case with the complete
sample, and a second case in which we exclude those prices higher than 3 times (or less than
a third) of the median daily price. However, deleted prices only account for a small 0.034%
of the whole database.
In order to compute the linear distance between each pair of stores in our sample, we use
information on the exact geographical location of each supermarket as provided by Ciudata,
an industry organization. We then construct distance bins using a geometric sequence start-
ing from 0.1 kilometers, and incrementing by ((526/0.1)1/N)%. Our baseline estimation uses
N=500 bins, but we re-estimated our results using 50, 100, and 1,000 bins as well. We then
calculate the distance between all supermarkets in the sample (333) and assign each pair of
supermarkets (55,278) to its proper bin according to their distance range.
14See http://www.precios.uy/servicios/ciudadanos.html.
15See Borraz and Zipitria (2012) for a detailed description of the database and an analysis on its price
stickiness.
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Finally, we deﬁne the following speciﬁcation:
Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) = α + βDn + γBn + δ1Bn ×Dn + δ2Firmn + n (9)
where Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) is the qth quantile of the absolute price diﬀerences for all store pairs i
and j whose distance belongs to bin n; Dn measures the distance between stores that belong
to bin n; Bn is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the supermarkets are in diﬀerent cities;
Firmn is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the price diﬀerence in bin n comes from
the same supermarket chain. We also add an interaction dummy between distance and the
city border dummy, and ﬁxed eﬀects for each good.
Notice that this regression requires that we have both observations within and across
cities that overlap in distance bins. Figure 6 shows the distribution of observations for each
of the 500 bins for the same city pairs and the diﬀerent city pairs. The horizontal axis is the
log distance starting at 100 meters to a maximum of 526 km. The black line is the number
of observations per bin for the stores within the same city boundaries, while the gray line
are the observations for the stores in diﬀerent cities. There is a non-trivial range in which
stores are separated exactly by the same distance within cities and across cities although
almost all of them between 5 to 15 kilometers. This is the source of the variation where the
city-border eﬀect is actually estimated.
[Figure 6 here]
4 Results
As described in Section 2.2, we pool all the prices into each corresponding bin and estimate
the distribution of price diﬀerences. We select the mean, median, 80, 85, 90, 95, 97.5, 99, 99.5
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and 99.9th percentiles. For each of these we estimate equation (9) by weighted least squares
to account for diﬀerences in the number of observations inside each bin. Price diﬀerences
are expressed in percentage terms, while distance is measured in hundreds of kilometers.
[Table 2 about here]
The results are presented in Table 2. The ﬁrst coeﬃcient is the segmentation generated
by distance. The second and third estimate the eﬀect of the city boundaries (border dummy)
and the interaction term (how the eﬀect of distance changes once the stores are in diﬀerent
cities), respectively. The fourth coeﬃcient is the impact of both stores belonging to the same
retailer, and the last one is the constant term. Each column reﬂects a diﬀerent regression.
The ﬁrst one uses the mean within each bin, which replicates the standard regressions in
the literature. After that we present the results for the quantiles moving from the 50th until
99.9th percentiles and ﬁnally the maximum.
Notice that as we increase the percentile, all individual coeﬃcients increase in line with
the intuition we discussed before. This pattern can be easily appreciated in Figures 7 and
8, which show the coeﬃcient on distance and city dummy, respectively, as a function of the
percentile.
[Figure 7 and Figure 8 here]
There are two alternatives to compute the border eﬀect. One way is to base the eﬀect
upon a speciﬁc distance. First, we calculate the degree of price dispersion when the two
stores are located in diﬀerent cities. Then we solve for the distance that would be needed for
two stores within the same city to have the same degree of price dispersion. The following
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example clariﬁes the analysis.16 Using the results in the ﬁrst column (average) in Table 2,
we compute the price dispersion of two cities across the border that are 10 km apart. The
price dispersion is 5.081 + 4.188 ∗ 0.1 + 1.260− 4.049 ∗ 0.1 = 6.355. Two stores in the same
city exhibit a segmentation equal to 5.081 + 4.188 ∗ X. Solving for X to make the within
city segmentation equal to 6.355 yields 30.5 km. Therefore the border adds 20 kilometers
to two stores 10 kilometers apart that is, the city border triples the distance. Although
the literature simply uses the ratio of the two coeﬃcients to compute the border eﬀect, our
speciﬁcation also allows for non-linearities. Therefore the implied border eﬀect needs to be
estimated conditional to a given distance.
In Panel (a) of Figure 9 we compute this implied additional distance for two stores 10
km apart for each of the quantiles. The border eﬀect, as measured in kilometers, collapses
towards zero around the 99.5th percentile. Interestingly, the eﬀect is even found negative
at the highest percentiles. In addition, notice the (almost) monotonic decrease in the esti-
mates. This is encouraging from an errors-in-variables point of view. If the maximum of
the distribution were the result of large errors-in-variables, there is no reason to expect the
estimates and the impact of the border eﬀect to remain similar to the upper percentiles.
[Figure 9 here]
The second way to compute the border eﬀect is to focus on the relative price dispersion for
a given distance. In other words, we compute how large is the implied degree of segmentation
for a pair of stores 10 km apart across two cities, relative to another pair of stores 10 km
apart within the same city. In both cases we consider all stores that do not belong to the
same retailer. For instance, in the average case (column 1 in Table 2) the price dispersion
16We show the results for 10 kilometers but results remain qualitatively the same for stores 15 and 20
kilometers apart. Given the characteristics of our data, it makes no sense to go beyond that distance because
in the city of Montevideo there are very few observations with stores more than 20 kilometers apart.
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for Dn = 0.1 and Bn = 1 is, as before, 5.081 + 4.188 ∗ 0.1 + 1.260 − 4.049 ∗ 0.1 = 6.355.
The price dispersion when Bn = 0 is 5.081 + 4.188 ∗ 0.1 = 5.499. Thus the border implies
a 15.57 percent higher degree of segmentation. However, this relative eﬀect becomes small
and insigniﬁcant using higher quantiles. In Panel (b) in Figure 9 we present the decreasing
pattern in the relative degree of segmentation, together with its 95th conﬁdence band.
Panels (a) and (b) show that the degree of segmentation is overestimated and the impact
of distance is underestimated when the average price deviations are used. By contrast, the
eﬀect of the border becomes not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when the upper quantiles
of the distribution within each bin are used. Notice that the reduction in the border eﬀect
is not a mechanical consequence of the methodology. The estimation using upper quantiles
should in fact increase the absolute value of all coeﬃcients simply because there is less
sample selection. The decrease in the ﬁnal border eﬀect, however, comes from the fact that
the bias in the distance coeﬃcient is larger than in the border coeﬃcient.
4.1 Robustness
In this section we test the sensibility of the baseline estimates to changing the speciﬁcation
of the regression, to diﬀerent subsamples of product mix, elimination of outliers, and to
diﬀerent number of bins. In all cases we ﬁnd that the results are qualitatively similar. That
is, the traditional regression (average price dispersion) estimates a large and signiﬁcant city
border eﬀect, whereas quantile regressions show that the city border becomes insigniﬁcant
using upper quantiles of the distribution. Furthermore, the results are similar at the highest
percentiles and the maximum, suggesting that the estimates are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
measurement errors.
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First, we modify the equation to the following non-linear speciﬁcation:
Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) = α + βDn + γBn + δ1Bn ×Dn + δ2D2n + δ3D3n
+δ4Bn ×D2n + δ5Bn ×D3n + δ6Firmn + n (10)
where the variables are deﬁned as in equation 9.
The results, presented in Table 3, yield the same patterns we described above for the base-
line estimation. In absolute value, all point estimates increase as the estimation is performed
over the higher quantiles. Furthermore, if one computes the implied additional distance, the
results remain qualitatively the same as those in Panel (a) in Figure 9. The border eﬀect, as
measured in kilometers, is close to 25 km using the traditional regression (average). However
it decreases with higher percentiles, until it becomes small and insigniﬁcant at the 97.5th
percentile.
In addition, we perform three robustness tests using diﬀerent subsamples. Results are
presented in Appendix A.3, for both the linear and non-linear speciﬁcations. First, we
eliminate products in which the matching across stores is not perfect. In particular, we
exclude meat, bread, among other categories. Quantile regressions yield identical patterns
as when using the complete dataset. Second, we use all products but eliminate the outliers,
deﬁned here as those whose price is above three times (or a third below) the median price.
This approach is more conservative that the one typically used in the literature. For example,
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) eliminate prices that are
more than 10 times higher or less that a tenth of the median price. Still, our rule only
excludes 11.2 thousand in 32.8 million, or just 0.034% of the observations. Once again, the
patterns are almost identical to the ones obtained using the complete number of observations.
The only minor diﬀerence is that, for a given percentile, the border eﬀects are smaller in
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absolute terms. In other words, the estimated implied distances are smaller than those in
Panel (a) in Figure 9. Third, we further combine the two cases above and estimate quantile
regressions excluding goods with imperfect matching as well as those deﬁned as outliers. The
results do not yield signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to our baseline estimation.
Lastly, we tested the linear and non-linear speciﬁcations to the sensibility of the number
of distance bins. Instead of 500 bins, we re-estimated using 50, 100, and 1,000 bins. Notice
the trade-oﬀ in the selection of bins. The advantage of a larger number of bins is that each
pair of stores is allocated to a very speciﬁc distance bin and the distance representing the
bin is closer to the real distance across the stores. The disadvantage is that the number of
observations within each bin decreases. In the limit, if the bins are so narrow that each store
pair belongs to a single bin, then the problem is that the estimation at the 99.9 percentile
becomes very noisy.17 The results are qualitatively the same to the baseline estimation. The
city-border eﬀect measured in kilometers falls and becomes insigniﬁcant when the upper
quantiles are used in the estimation.
5 The Online Border Eﬀect
We now use online and oine prices from a retailer in Uruguay to estimate an online border
eﬀect. The degree of segmentation between online and oine markets is an interesting topic
by itself, but has received little attention because of the data limitations. Selling online
allows a retailer to price discriminate among consumers who have time to travel to a store
and those who prefer the convenience of online shopping. By deciding to buy online, the
17Future research should formally address the optimal bandwidth selection. For the moment we compare
the results across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and do not explore the issue further because the results remain
essentially identical. It is possible that if the estimation is done using less frequent data such as month by
month, or using a much smaller dataset, then the issue of bandwidth selection becomes more important.
This was not the case in our application.
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consumer may therefore be paying a cost in terms of price dispersion (in addition to any
delivery charges).
We use data collected by the Billion Prices Project at MIT (BPP) using a method that
scans the HyperText Markup Language (HTML) code of public retailers' website, identifying
and storing all relevant price and product information on a daily basis.18 The largest grocery
retailer in Uruguay sells products in dozens of oine locations, as well as online, in the city
of Montevideo. We compared the daily prices of all goods in the DGC oine data with
their corresponding online price on the same date. Both datasets contain daily prices for the
period between October 1st 2007 and December 31th 2010.
Figure 10 provides an example of the prices posted in the diﬀerent stores (including the
online store) for a given product over time. On most dates, the online price is within the
range of prices observed in oine stores. This feature is observed in most goods in the
sample.
[ Figure 10 here ]
Suppose a consumer decides to buy a good from the retailer's website instead of walking
to an oine location. What is the eﬀect of crossing this online border on prices? We
can calculate an online border eﬀect by simply estimating the implied distance that would
produce the same degree of online-oine price dispersion observed in the data. We calculate
this eﬀect in two steps. First, we estimate the following regression for each quantile q using
only data from the oine stores:
Qn (|pi,t − pj,t|, q) = λ+ βDn + n (11)
18See Cavallo (2010) for additional details on the online data scraping methodology.
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Notice this is equal to equation 9 with Bn = 0 (same city), Firmn = 1 (same retailer),
and λ = α + γ. The coeﬃcient β therefore provides an estimate of the eﬀect of distance
on the dispersion of prices across locations. Finally, to calculate the implied online border
eﬀect we simply compute the average online-oine price dispersion (between all pairs of
online-oine stores), subtract the constant λ and divide by β.
[Table 4 here]
We estimated regression 11 using both the traditional and the binned-quantile methods,
and computed the online border in both cases. Table 4 shows that using the traditional OLS
regression provides an implied distance of 1.6 kilometers. By contrast, if we use the 95th
percentile we obtain an implied distance of 8.78 kilometers.
How do we know which estimate is better? We can compare the results in both methods
to the actual distance of the online store. Although the warehouse of the online store is
not known, the website of this retailer states that the online prices are identical to those
available in an oine store that ﬁlls the orders. It fails to name it explicitly, but we can
compute a simple matching probability between the online prices and each of the oine
stores to identify it. This matching probability is just the average probability that the online
price is identical to the price in an oine store on any given day. We calculate it at the store
level in two steps. First, for each product, we compute the share of days that the online
price is identical to the oine price. And second, we get the mean (or median) across all
products in that store.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 shows that online prices most closely resemble those of oine store number
22. The last column in the table shows the physical distance between store 22 and each
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of the other oine stores. The average distance is 7.22 kilometers (and a median of 8.04
km). This number is very close to the estimate we obtained by using the 95th percentile in
the regression. In this case, the traditional regression greatly underestimates the degree of
online-oine market segmentation.
This example illustrates why our method will not mechanically cause a reduction in
border eﬀects every time. By using the largest observed price diﬀerences, we know that
all coeﬃcients and constant in 9 will increase, because the standard OLS method creates a
downward bias in all of them. But whether the border eﬀect rises or falls depends on the
magnitude of those changes. In the case of the online border in equation 11, the distance
coeﬃcient β rises less than the constant, as shown in Table 4. This is because we are only
looking at stores within the city of Montevideo, where the share of identical prices is very
large. When the traditional OLS regression is used, the average price dispersion captured by
λ is extremely small. When those identical prices are ignored, as we do with our methodology,
λ rises signiﬁcantly more than the β coeﬃcient on distance, and the border eﬀect" increases.
6 Conclusions
The extensive literature on the degree of segmentation resulting from political borders has
reported extremely large transaction costs introduced by country, province, and even city
borders. In this paper we argue that some of those estimates have been overstated because
the empirical strategy has not taken into account the selection problem in posted prices:
when a ﬁrm faces the possibility of arbitrage due to the existence of a transaction cost,
the ﬁrm sets prices subject to a no-arbitrage constraint. However, if the optimal price falls
within the no-arbitrage range, the dispersion in prices is not informative of the tightness of
the constraint. A ﬁrm may set the same price in two locations, but it does not mean that
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the arbitrage cost for the consumer is zero. This implies that the estimation using average
absolute price diﬀerences or standard deviations of price diﬀerences will not capture the size
of the trade or arbitrage cost.
This paper builds on the existing literature with two main contributions. In the ﬁrst place,
it oﬀers an alternative methodology to estimate transactions costs which not only can be
applied in international trade, but also in other areas as in empirical ﬁnance, measurement
of liquidity, or the cost of regulatory restrictions. In the second place, we show that city
borders matter little for price dispersion within a country. Although the border eﬀect of a
city should be small from an intuitive point of view, the traditional methods still estimated
a very wide border eﬀect (20 additional kilometers to two stores separated 10 km apart,
that is, the border triples the distance). This is particularly large in a country where the
largest city is less than 40 kilometers wide and there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
cities in terms of taxes, language and the like. By contrast, the border becomes insigniﬁcant
once we estimate using our method of distance-binned quantile regressions. We illustrate our
method to measure border eﬀects for the online-oine border in Montevideo, and showed
that we can correctly approximate the true average distance between the oine stores and
the location where online purchases are sourced by simply using price gap data.
Finally, we believe further research should advance in at least two dimensions. From a
methodological point of view, it is important to further examine the deﬁnition of optimal
bandwidths. Although in our paper we used diﬀerent bin sizes and results remained consis-
tent across all speciﬁcations, this may not be the case in other applications in economics.
And second, similar micro-level data needs to be collected across several countries to shed
light on the actual width of international borders.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Price dispersion and the arbitrage cost
(a) Binding no-arbitrage condition
(b) Non binding no-arbitrage condition
Note: Panel (a) shows cases where the no-arbitrage condition constrains the price dispersion. Panel (b) cases
where the price dispersion is not correlated with the arbitrage cost.
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Figure 2: Example of Price Gaps in Diﬀerent Store Pairs
Distance Same City Share at 0% Price Gaps (in %)
(Km) (in %) Mean 90th 99th 99.9th
1 yes 96.5 0.3 0 11.1 20.5
10 yes 76.6 1.9 8.64 16.9 25.1
10 no 73.6 2.0 9.46 16.9 25.1
20 no 69.3 2.6 10.6 26.9 39.3
Note: We calculate the price gaps (in absolute value) for all goods sold in a single retailer across two locations.
We picked a random store from the largest retailer in the country and compared its prices to those of other
stores from the same retailer located at 1 km, 10 km (same city), 10 km (diﬀerent city), and 20 km (diﬀerent
city). Where DC denotes pairs in diﬀerent cities. The graph excludes the mass at 0% to facilitate the
comparison of positive gaps. The table shows the distributional statistics for all price gaps, including those
at 0% (identical prices).
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Figure 3: Bias in Standard Regressions
Note: This ﬁgure illustrates the source of the selection bias. The horizontal axis shows the bins for a range
of distances. The vertical axis is the absolute price diﬀerence across locations. For each bin, all the absolute
diﬀerences from the data are shown as the black dots. The thick black line reﬂects the price diﬀerence
implied by the no-arbitrage constraint. Because all the observed price diﬀerences are less or equal to the
thick line, the estimation in the standard regression which implicitly uses the mean within each bin (red
line) is downward biased.
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Figure 4: Bias in Standard Regression in the presence of EIV
Note: The black thick line is still the true upper bound of the no-arbitrage band, i.e. the true degree of
segmentation. However due to EIV, some price diﬀerences might even be above the no-arbitrage range. In
this case, using the maximum within each bin also produces a bias in the estimation. For this reason we use
a series of quantile regressions instead.
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Figure 5: Cities covered in the sample
Note: Each dot represents a store location across the 19 Uruguayan departments.
Figure 6: Distribution of observations for 500 bins in the same city and between cities
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Note: The black line shows the distribution of bilateral observations for each of the 500 bins within cities,
while the grey line (extending to the right, with multiple peaks) shows the distribution across cities. Lines
are smoothed for better visualization.
34
Figure 7: Estimation of the distance coeﬃcient by quantile
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Note: Estimated distance coeﬃcient when diﬀerent quantiles are used for the baseline regression.
Figure 8: Estimation of the city coeﬃcient by quantile
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Note: Estimated city dummy coeﬃcient when diﬀerent quantiles are used for the baseline regression.
35
Figure 9: Estimation of the city border eﬀect using all data
(a) Implied Kilometers
Additional Km implied by City Border Eﬀect for Stores 10 Km Apart
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(b) Relative Increase in Price Dispersion
of City Borders for Stores 10 Km Apart.
Note: Panel (a) shows the implied additional km for the linear speciﬁcation using all data and 500 bins.
Panel (b) shows the relative increase in the degree of segmentation for the baseline linear speciﬁcation, with
its 95th percent conﬁdence band.
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Figure 10: Example of Online and Oine Prices: Cocoa - 0.5Kg
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Note: This is an example of the typical time series pattern of online prices compared to oine prices in the
same city of Montevideo. Each line is a diﬀerent store. The online price is marked with a dotted line, and
tends to lie in-between the prices of the oine stores.
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Table 1: Product, time, and regional coverage in the data
All Stores
(i) Retailers 136
(ii) Stores 333
(iii) Products 202
(iv) Categories 61
(v) Country Uruguay
(vi) Cities 47
(vii) Departments 19
(viii) Time Period April 1st 2007 to
December 31st 2010
(ix) Days 1,154
(x) Observations
(bins)
179,215
(xi) Observations
(pairs)
32,159,865
Note: Summary statistics of the data compiled by The
General Directorate of Commerce (DGC).
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Table 4: The Online-Oine Border
Price Diﬀerence
(1) (2)
Variables Mean 95th Percentile
Log Distance 0.100*** 0.156***
(-0.005) (-0.010)
Constant 0.439*** 3.177***
(-0.174) (-0.362)
Observations 2300 2300
Diﬀerence Online-Oine (%) 0.60 4.55
Implied Distance (Km) 1.60 8.78
Note: *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. We
measure the online border eﬀect, deﬁned as the implied distance between
the oine stores and the online stores. If the usual procedure is used,
online and oine markets appear to be very closely integrated, with an
equivalent border of 1.6 kilometers. When the 95th percentile of the price
gap distribution is used, the online border eﬀect becomes 8.8 kilometers.
This is very close to the actual physical average distance between the online
warehouse (store 22, where the online goods appear to be delivered from)
and each of the oine stores in the city.
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Table 5: Online vs Oine stores
Store City Online Match Probability Distance to Store 22
22 Montevideo 97.34 0.00
31 Montevideo 96.59 1.28
39 Montevideo 96.59 1.88
41 Montevideo 96.83 2.32
21 Montevideo 96.83 2.72
38 Montevideo 96.58 3.32
33 Montevideo 81.85 5.66
34 Montevideo 96.96 6.50
35 Montevideo 96.70 8.04
32 Montevideo 81.702 8.84
43 Montevideo 81.18 8.96
28 Montevideo 81.68 9.23
30 Montevideo 96.54 10.58
27 Montevideo 81.73 11.81
23 Montevideo 81.57 12.87
36 Montevideo 81.56 13.29
42 Montevideo 81.37 15.42
Mean 89.62 7.22
Median 96.54 8.04
Note: The Online Match Probability shows the percentage of days in which the
online price is identical to the price observed oine in a particular store. Distance
from store 22 to the other oine stores is measured in kilometers.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs to the model of price-setting with arbitrage
A.1.1 Consumers
Lemma 1. The price space is non empty.
Proof. Given prices pi and pj the right hand side of the inequality is non negative for the
consumer located on store `i. In this case, equation 6 is | pi − pj |≤ β˜θ |`− `j| + γ˜θ bj + δ˜θIj,
as ` = `i. This implies that there must exist at least one price in order for the consumer to
compare its bundles. Thus both the right and left hand side of the inequality are positive.
Lemma 2. The inequality constraint is binding only for the marginal consumer.
Proof. The marginal consumer can be deﬁned as the one obtaining the same utility from
buying in both stores, that is u` (i) = u` (j). This in turn implies that v − θpi − β˜ |`− `i| −
γ˜bi − δ˜Ii = v − θpj − β˜ | `− `j | −γ˜bj − δ˜Ij. Rearranging terms we obtain that | pi − pj |=
β˜
θ
|`j − `i|+ γ˜θ M bi,j + δ˜θ M Ii,j.
A.1.2 Producers
Lemma 3. Firms maximize proﬁts by setting the price that binds the participation constraint
for consumer i.
Proof. Given the prices of all stores except for j, and given the right hand side of the
equation in terms of pj, Kuhn Tucker conditions determine that the price diﬀerence should
be maximal. That is, when the consumer restriction is binding. At the same time, notice
that the marginal consumer for ﬁrm j determines the demand for its products.
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Proposition 4. The consumer that maximizes proﬁts is the marginal consumer.
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the ﬁrm sets the maximum price for the marginal
consumer.
Proposition 5. For any given two stores (locations), the parameters can only be estimated
for the marginal consumer, i.e. where the inequality is binding.
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Proposition 4, the ﬁrm sets its price for the marginal consumer
such that equation 6 is binding. Therefore the price diﬀerences will be maximum given the
store location and other exogenous variables for the consumer.
Lemma 6. If transportation costs increase (beta) or a border exists between two stores, or if
the sensitivity of the consumer to price changes decrease, then the price dispersion increase.
Proof. Take partial derivatives of each coeﬃcient on the last equation of Lemma 2.
A.1.3 Consumer heterogeneity: Discussion
So far we have assumed that consumers only diﬀer in their location on the line. However
consumers can also diﬀer in their valuation of the good. This feature can be introduced to the
original model in either two ways. First, consumers can diﬀer in their maximum valuation
of the good, in which case v ∈ [v, v]. In this case, previous results are easily maintained
as well, although now satisfying two conditions for the marginal consumer: indiﬀerence in
distance and in valuation. Recall that previous results are for the medium consumer. Second,
consumers can diﬀer in their disposition to pay for the good, i.e. θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Similarly
as before, there are two constraints to estimate the demand for each store: the distance
constraint and the valuation constraint.
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Therefore adding heterogeneity to consumers' taste does not change the estimation pro-
cedure. In order to estimate the demand for each store, we must still solve the model for
the marginal consumer. As previously shown, the price inequality should only be binding
for this consumer, and slack for non-marginal consumers.
A.2 Samuelson's Iceberg Costs
The results from our model of product arbitrage is also related to the no-arbitrage pricing
region generated in Samuelson's Iceberg costs.19 Assume that there is an arbitrage cost
between two locations that can be described as follows:
τi,j,t = α + βDi,j + γBi,j + δXi,j,t (12)
where the variables are deﬁned as before. This arbitrage cost τ represents the proportion of
the item that is lost when a customer transports one unit from i to j.20 Under this form of
arbitrage costs, prices need to lie within the range |pi − pj| ≤ τi,j,t to avoid the possibility
that a customer arbitrates across locations. In particular, assume that pi is set. The second
store, when deciding its price, maximizes proﬁts subject to the no-arbitrage constraint. If
the optimal price is such that the diﬀerence between pi and pj is smaller than τ then the
constraint is not binding and the price diﬀerence is a biased estimate of τ . But if the
diﬀerence is larger, then the store sets the price at the corner solution and the constraint
is binding. This simple behavior implies that the absolute diﬀerence of log prices satisﬁes
inequality 1, which can be rewritten as |pi − pj| ≤ τi,j,t = α + βDi,j + γB + δXi,j,t.
19See Samuelson (1954).
20For simplicity in the exposition it is assumed that the arbitrageur is the customer itself. Thus the
arbitrage cost can be interpreted not only as the loss of physical items, but also the loss in terms of utility
that the customer would experience if were forced to travel from one location to another.
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A.3 Alternative Speciﬁcations
Figure 11: Estimation of the city border eﬀect excluding meat and bread
(a) Implied Kilometers
Additional Km implied by City Border Eﬀect for Stores 10 Km Apart
−
10
0
10
20
30
Km
Mean 80 85 90 95 97.5 99 99.5 99.9 Max
Percentile
(b) Relative Increase in Price Dispersion
of City Borders for Stores 10 Km Apart
Note: Panel (a) shows the additional km implied by the city border eﬀect for the linear speciﬁcation, excluding
meat and bread, and using 500 bins. Panel (b) shows the relative increase in the degree of segmentation,
with its 95th percent conﬁdence band, for the same speciﬁcation.
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Figure 12: Estimation of the city border eﬀect using all data and excluding outliers
(a) Implied Kilometers
Additional Km implied by City Border Eﬀect for Stores 10 Km Apart
0
5
10
15
20
25
Km
Mean 80 85 90 95 97.5 99 99.5 99.9 Max
Percentile
(b) Relative Increase in Price Dispersion
of City Borders for Stores 10 Km Apart
Note: Panel (a) shows the additional km implied by the city border eﬀect for the linear speciﬁcation,
excluding outliers, and using 500 bins. Panel (b) shows the relative increase in the degree of segmentation,
with its 95th percent conﬁdence band, for the same speciﬁcation.
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Figure 13: Estimation of the city border eﬀect excluding meat, bread, and outliers
(a) Implied Kilometers
Additional Km implied by City Border Eﬀect for Stores 10 Km Apart
−
10
0
10
20
Km
Mean 80 85 90 95 97.5 99 99.5 99.9 Max
Percentile
(b) Relative Increase in Price Dispersion
of City Borders for Stores 10 Km Apart
Note: Panel (a) shows the additional km implied by the city border eﬀect for the linear speciﬁcation,
excluding meat, bread, as well as outliers, using 500 bins. Panel (b) shows the relative increase in the degree
of segmentation, with its 95th percent conﬁdence band, for the same speciﬁcation.
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A.4 Data Details
Table 9: Description of products in the database and share in CPI.
Product Brand Speciﬁcation Share in CPI (%)
Beer Pilsen 0.96 L 0.38
Beer Patricia 0.96 L 0.38
Beer Zillertal 1 L 0.38
Bleach Agua Jane 1 L n/i
Bleach Solucion Cristal 1 L n/i
Bleach Sello Rojo 1 L n/i
Bovine Beef "Aguja" No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Aguja" No Brand 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Aguja" With Bone - No Brand 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Aguja" Boneless - No Brand 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Aguja" With Bone - No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Aguja" Boneless - No Brand 1 Kg 0.23
Bovine Beef "Nalga" No Brand - Novillo 1 Kg 0.32
Bovine Beef "Nalga" With Bone - No Brand 1 Kg 0.32
Bovine Beef "Nalga" Boneless - No Brand 1 Kg 0.32
Bovine Beef "Nalga" Boneless - No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.32
Bovine Beef "Nalga" With Bone - No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.32
Bovine Beef "Paleta" With Bone - No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.20
Bovine Beef "Paleta" Boneless - No Brand 1 Kg 0.20
Bovine Beef "Paleta" With Bone - No Brand 1 Kg 0.20
Bovine Beef "Peceto" No Brand 1 Kg 0.16
Bovine Beef "Peceto" No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.16
Bovine Beef "Rueda" With Bone - No Brand 1 Kg 0.17
Bovine Beef "Rueda" With Bone - No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.17
Bread Bimbo 0.33 Kg 0.06
Bread Los Sorchantes 0.33 Kg 0.06
Bread Pan Catalan 0.33 Kg 0.06
Bread No Brand 1 Unit Aprox. 0.215 Kg 1.14
Brown Eggs El Ecologito 1/2 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs El Jefe 1/2 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs Prodhin 1/2 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs Super huevo 1/2 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs El Ecologito 1 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs El Jefe 1 Dozen 0.46
Brown Eggs Prodhin 1 Dozen 0.46
Burgers Burgy 3 Units 0.17
Burgers Schneck 2 Units 0.17
Burgers Paty 2 Units 0.17
Butter LacterÃa 0.2 Kg 0.23
Butter Conaprole sin sal 0.2 Kg 0.23
Butter Calcar 0.2 Kg 0.23
Butter Kasdorf 0.2 Kg 0.23
Cacao Copacabana 0.5 Kg 0.08
Cacao Aguila 0.5 Kg 0.08
Cacao Vascolet 0.5 Kg 0.08
Cacao Saint 0.5 Kg 0.08
Cheese Cerros del Este 1 Kg 0.21
Cheese Dispnat 1 Kg 0.21
Chicken Avesur 1 Kg 0.83
Chicken Tenent 1 Kg 0.83
Chicken Avicola del Oeste 1 Kg 0.83
Chicken Melilla 1 Kg 0.83
Chicken Tres Arroyos 1 Kg 0.83
Coﬀee Aguila 0.25 Kg 0.09
Coﬀee Chana 0.25 Kg 0.09
Coﬀee Saint 0.25 Kg 0.09
Coﬀee Tropical 0.2 Kg 0.09
Cola Coca Cola 1.5 L 1.23
Cola Pepsi 1.5 L 1.23
Cola Nix 1.5 L 1.23
Cola Coca Cola 2.25 L 1.23
Cola Pepsi 2 L 1.23
Corn oil Delicia 0.9 L n/i
Continue in next page.
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Table 9  continued from previous page
Product Brand Speciﬁcation Share in CPI (%)
Corn oil Rio de la Plata 0.9 L n/i
Corn oil Salad 1 Kg n/i
Cornmeal Gourmet 0.45 Kg n/i
Cornmeal Presto Pronta Arcor 0.5 Kg n/i
Cornmeal Puritas 0.45 Kg n/i
Crakers Famosa 0.14 Kg 0.28
Crakers Maestro Cubano 0.12 Kg 0.28
Crakers El Trigal 0.15 Kg 0.28
Deodorant Axe Musk 0.113 Kg 0.34
Deodorant Dove Original 0.1 Kg 0.34
Deodorant Rexona Active Emotion 0.105 Kg 0.34
Diswashing detergent Hurra Nevex Limon 1.25 L 0.13
Diswashing detergent Deterjane 1.25 L 0.13
Diswashing detergent Protergente limon 1 L 0.13
Dulce de leche Conaprole 1 Kg 0.14
Dulce de leche Manjar 1 Kg 0.14
Dulce de leche Los Nietitos 1 Kg 0.14
Fish No Brand 1 Kg 0.43
Flour Cololo 1 Kg 0.21
Flour Canuelas 1 Kg 0.21
Flour Cololo 1 Kg 0.21
Flour Puritas 1 Kg 0.21
Frankfurters Cattivelli 8 Units - Aprox. 0.340 Kg 0.23
Frankfurters Ottonello 8 Units - Aprox. 0.330 Kg 0.23
Frankfurters Schneck 8 Units - Aprox. 0.330 Kg 0.23
Frankfurters Centenario 8 Units - Aprox. 0.33 Kg 0.23
Frankfurters Sarubbi 8 Units 0.23
Frozen ﬁsh No Brand 1 Kg n/i
Grated Cheese Conaprole 0.08 Kg 0.16
Grated Cheese El Trebol 0.08 Kg 0.16
Grated Cheese Milky 0.08 Kg 0.16
Grated Cheese Artesano 0.08 Kg 0.16
Grit Noodles Adria 0.5 Kg 0.43
Grit Noodles Las Acacias 0.5 Kg 0.43
Grit Noodles Puritas 0.5 Kg 0.43
Ground Beef No Brand - Cow 1 Kg 0.98
Ground Beef No Brand 1 Kg 0.98
Ground Beef Up to 20% Fat 1 Kg 0.98
Ground Beef Up to 5% Fat 1 Kg 0.14
Ham La Constancia 1 Kg 0.16
Ham Schneck 1 Kg 0.16
Ham Centenario 1 Kg 0.16
Ice cream Cruﬁ 1 L 0.22
Ice cream Conaprole 1 L 0.22
Ice cream Gebetto 1 L 0.22
Laundry Soap Nevex 0.8 Kg 0.45
Laundry Soap Drive 0.8 Kg 0.45
Laundry Soap Skip - Paquete azul 0.8 Kg 0.45
Laundry Soap in Bar Bull Dog 0.3 Kg - 1 Unit n/i
Laundry Soap in Bar Nevex 0.2 Kg - 1 Unit n/i
Margarine Doriana nueva 0.25 Kg n/i
Margarine Primor 0.25 Kg n/i
Margarine Danica dorada 0.2 Kg n/i
Margarine Flor 0.25 Kg n/i
Mayonnaise Hellmans 0.5 Kg 0.21
Mayonnaise Natura 0.5 Kg 0.21
Mayonnaise Fanacoa 0.5 Kg 0.21
Mayonnaise Uruguay 0.5 Kg 0.21
Noodles Cololo 0.5 Kg 0.43
Peach Jam Los Nietitos 0.5 Kg n/i
Peach Jam Dulciora 0.5 Kg n/i
Peach Jam Limay 0.5 Kg n/i
Peach jam El Hogar 0.5 Kg n/i
Peas Arcor 0.35 Kg 0.09
Peas El Hogar 0.35 Kg 0.09
Peas Trofeo 0.35 K 0.09
Peas Campero 0.3 Kg 0.09
Peas Cololo 0.38 Kg 0.09
Peas Nidemar 0.3 Kg 0.09
Continue in next page.
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Table 9  continued from previous page
Product Brand Speciﬁcation Share in CPI (%)
Quince jam Los Nietitos 0.4 Kg 0.13
Quince jam Limay 0.4 Kg 0.13
Rice Green Chef 1 Kg 0.38
Rice Blue Patna 1 Kg 0.38
Rice Aruba tipo Patna 1 Kg 0.38
Rice Pony 1 Kg 0.38
Rice Vidarroz 1 Kg 0.38
Rice Saman Blanco 1 Kg 0.38
Salt Sek 0.5 Kg 0.09
Salt Urusal 0.5 Kg 0.09
Salt Torrevieja 0.5 Kg 0.09
Sausage Cattivelli - Extra 1 Kg 0.37
Sausage La Familia - Hilo amarillo 1 Kg 0.37
Sausage Centenario - Extra 1 Kg 0.37
Semolina Noodles Adria 0.5 Kg 0.43
Semolina Noodles Las Acacias - franja celeste 0.5 Kg 0.43
Shampoo Sedal 0.35 L 0.36
Shampoo Suave 0.93 L 0.36
Shampoo Fructis 0.35 L 0.36
Soap Astral 0.125 Kg 0.16
Soap Palmolive 0.125 Kg 0.16
Soap Suave 0.125 Kg 0.16
Soap Astral plata 0.125 Kg 0.16
Soap Rexona 0.125 Kg 0.16
Soap Primor 0.3 Kg n/i
Soybean Oil Condesa 0.9 L 0.11
Soybean oil Rio de la Plata 0.9 L 0.11
Soybean oil Salad 0.9 L 0.11
Sparkling Water Salus 2.25 L 0.82
Sparkling Water Matutina 2 L 0.82
Sparkling Water Nativa 2 L 0.82
Sugar Azucarlito 1 Kg 0.35
Sugar Bella Union 1 Kg 0.35
Sunﬂower oil Optimo 0.9 L 0.37
Sunﬂower oil Uruguay 0.9 L 0.37
Sunﬂower oil Rio de la Plata 0.9 L 0.37
Tea Hornimans Box 10 Units 0.07
Tea La Virginia Box 10 Units 0.07
Tea Lipton Box 10 Units 0.07
Tea President 10 Units 0.07
Toilet paper Higienol Export 4 Unit - 25 M each 0.24
Toilet paper Sin Fin 4 Unit - 25 M each 0.24
Toilet paper Personal 4 Unit - 25 M each 0.24
Toilet paper Elite 4 Units - 30 M each 0.24
Tomate pulp Gourmet 1 Kg 0.16
Tomato Paste Qualitas 1 L 0.16
Tomato Paste Conaprole 1 L 0.16
Tomato Paste De Ley 1 L 0.16
Toothpaste Colgate Total 0.09 Kg 0.19
Toothpaste Kolynos 0.09 Kg 0.19
Toothpaste Colgate Herbal Blanqueador 0.09 Kg 0.19
Toothpaste Closeup Triple 0.09 Kg 0.19
Toothpaste Kolynos Triple accion 0.09 Kg 0.19
Toothpaste Pico Jenner Plus 0.09 Kg 0.19
Wheat Flour Canuelas 1 Kg 0.21
Wheat Flour Primor 1 Kg 0.21
Wine Santa Teresa Clasico 1 L 0.79
Wine Tango 1 L 0.79
Wine Roses 1 L 0.79
Wine Faisan 1 L 0.79
Yerba Canarias 1 Kg 0.64
Yerba Sara 1 Kg 0.64
Yerba Envase Del Cebador 1 Kg 0.64
Yerba Del Cebador 1 Kg 0.64
Yerba Baldo 1 Kg 0.64
Yogurt Conaprole 0.5 Kg 0.13
Yogurt Parmalat (Skim) 0.5 Kg 0.14
Yogurt Calcar 1 L 0.14
Yogurt Conaprole BIO TOP 1.2 L 0.14
Continue in next page.
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Table 9  continued from previous page
Product Brand Speciﬁcation Share in CPI (%)
Yogurt Parmalat BIO YOGUR 1 L 0.14
Note: n/i means not included in the CPI, Kg. kilograms, L. liters and M. meters.
Source: Own elaboration from data of the Uruguayan Ministry of Economy and Finance.
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